Philosophical and pedagogical projects
The main goal of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with ways to read pedagogy from the standpoint of the main philosophical trends of our time. As a result of her study, the student must:
• ways of philosophical and pedagogical modeling;
• the history of their formation and development;
be able to
• determine the aspects of the main philosophical trends that are relevant to pedagogy;
• consider these aspects from the perspective of the theory of conceptual transitions;
• synthesize the achievements of philosophical and pedagogical projects;
• conceptual interpretation of the correlation between philosophy and pedagogy;
• a critical attitude to the views of various authors;
• the ability to combine the strengths of philosophical and pedagogical projects.
Key terms : philosophical and pedagogical project, philosophical transdisciplinarity.
Phenomenological project in pedagogy
Phenomenological philosophy, founded by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl, is rightfully considered one of the main philosophical trends of our time. Repeated attempts have been made to translate the sciences, especially the human sciences, in particular pedagogy, into phenomenological rails. Not always these attempts were adequately evaluated. We will try to correct this situation and evaluate the prospects of the phenomenological approach in pedagogy, while limiting ourselves mainly to the reconstruction of its foundations (see also paragraph 2.4).
Husserl was an expert not only in philosophy, but also in psychology and mathematics. However, even the state of these sciences he assessed negatively. The famous philosopher was well aware that the state of science is determined by the interpretation of the nature of concepts and it was this interpretation that he subjected to a decisive revision.
In Husserl's time, as in our days, the interpretation of concepts as abstractions and idealizations was widespread in science. Abstractions are obtained by excluding from the analysis of the non-essential (with only the essential remains). Ideals are the result of embellishment of the real, that is, its known distortion (for example, a body of small dimensions is considered a point formation, which it really is not).
According to Husserl, abstraction and idealization, as well as mechanization and formalization of knowledge, lead to formalism in science. Formalism appears insofar as science loses its fair share of vitality. Science as the most promising project of human progress ceases to meet its purpose. Husserl decided to revive science, giving it the fullest possible fullness of life. But how to achieve the goal?
First of all, Husserl needed to find an alternative to the method of abstractions and idealizations. Refusing him, he put forward his own method of synthesizing experiences. Husserl's basic idea was to understand concepts as a result of the synthesis of human experiences, accompanying the phenomena of what comes to people's minds from things. As a result, concepts are not transparent abstractions, but eidos - as specific as possible images of things, whether they are trees, minerals or people. Eidos simply see, or, in more scientific terms, are intuitively comprehended. They preserve the fullness of the vital world, saturated with emotions and emotions, Lebenswelt .
The concept of eidos goes back to ancient philosophy, in particular, to Plato. The founder of the theory of ideas, thinking about them, as a rule, used this term. Husserl vigorously advocated the ideals of eidetic science, which he considered an antidote to formalism. To avoid misunderstanding, we note that the founder of phenomenology had nothing against the formal sciences, for example, logic and mathematics. He opposed formalism in any science, including in formal disciplines. Formalism was understood to them not as the absolutization of formal sciences, but as oblivion of the fullness of the human life world.
Husserl believed that only the transfer of all philosophy and science to phenomenological rails can save mankind from global crises, such as fascism. The destruction of the vital world leads to decline, it induces indifference to people. That is why Husserl proclaimed the slogan "Back to things!", Back to the vital world, which is fully understood through the phenomenological method.
How right was Husserl? Was he not mistaken? In our opinion, his criticism of the method of abstractions and idealizations is quite legitimate. Of course, being an outstanding philosopher, Husserl understood that one should not completely abandon abstractions and idealizations, which are quite acceptable as simplifying the process of learning techniques. But these techniques are relevant only in the presence of concepts. Abstractions and idealizations are not methods of the initial formation of concepts, but their simplifications.
Does the method of synthesis of experiences deserve approval? Not at all. To a certain extent, Husserl repeated the mistakes of his opponents. Like them, Husserl believed that in relation to feelings, concepts in cognition are secondary, and not primary education. Feelings, including sensations, perceptions, ideas, emotions and experiences, are primary. In fact, all forms of human knowledge initially possess a conceptual nature. Interpret is not concepts on the basis of feelings, but feelings - through concepts. Here is an illustrative example to this effect.
Burned, a person experiences pain as a biological factor. To explain it you have to turn to the concepts of biology. If a person is told about a disaster that has happened to his relatives, he also experiences pain, which is explained by concepts, not biological, but social sciences. Our example illustrates the universal epistemological rule: all sensory manifestations of human life are types of concepts.
As for Husserl's demand for taking into account all human experiences, it seems to us that it should be welcomed, but ... given the known acceptability of the method of abstractions and idealizations (!). Above we outlined the limits of the relevance of this method. Unfortunately, it is often adopted uncritically, and its supposedly paramount power is most often justified by references to mathematics: there are no points, straight lines and flawlessly smooth surfaces, but nevertheless the corresponding concepts that are abstractions and idealizations stand out for their extraordinary relevance. The above reasoning does not hold water.
The correspondence between mathematical concepts of reality is clarified when they are used in modeling processes, during which mathematical concepts are loaded with non-mathematical content, for example, physical or economic. The following example is indicative in this respect. The point is not the physical body, but the center of mass of the physical system. In the latter case, it turns out that the concept of a mathematical point is not the result of abstractions and idealizations. It is also the case with all other mathematical concepts. Only in modeling, their real status is revealed, not distorted by abstractions and idealizations, as well as the possibility of linking them with these operations.
So, Husserl's application to the actual method for science sounded loud enough. There were many researchers who began to translate their favorite science into phenomenological rails. Husserl himself tried to rethink the geometry. Max Scheler, who in Germany was called the phenomenologist No. 2, attacked the formalism in ethics with criticism (Kant himself was accused of formalism). Albert Schütz developed the sociology of everyday life, arguing that it is not the arena of abstractions. Teachers also did not stay away from the phenomenological movement. However, among them, in our opinion, there were no figures with the phenomenological talent of Scheler or Schutz.
The first in 1914 tried to use the phenomenological method in the pedagogy A. Fisher. Today, the leading pedagogical phenomenologists are V. Loch, V. Lippitz, M. Langenfeld, K. Mayer-Dro. Their work is multifaceted, they somehow consider the authenticity of the student as "things" knowledge and upbringing. The same applies to any teaching activity, from a lesson in the class to a trip to the mountains.
Unfortunately, it is necessary to note that phenomenologists, as a rule, are not consistent in their constructions. For the reformers, they clearly lack scientific sagacity. The efforts of phenomenologists can be regarded as a desire to put the existing science on its head, and yet another thing is absolutely necessary: first, carefully delineate the limits of the applicability of the method of abstractions and idealizations; second, stop contrasting concepts with feelings, and thirdly, The feelings themselves should be saved from the claims of sensationalism and intuition. With this task, phenomenologists, including Husserl and Scheler, failed to cope. It is especially regrettable that the phenomenological method of his adepts could not be organically combined with the conceptual content of science.
In this regard, the statement of R. A. Kurenkova, which has made a phenomenological method useful for enriching United States pedagogy, is significant. In her opinion, "the primacy of the phenomenological point of view in this or that pedagogical situation means the ability to build on the phenomenon as such, and not on certain ideas, concepts, theories. Therefore, the comprehension of the goals and objectives of education can be carried out only in the integral context of life. " But ideas, concepts and theories are themselves the organic content of the life context. To think differently means to abandon the conceptual content of science and, therefore, from it itself.
In our opinion, the synthesis of experiences so interested in phenomenologists is nothing more than a sensory aspect of the cycle of concepts, including their deduction, adduction (experiment), abduction (the derivation of laws from the statistics of experimental data) and induction use of experimental laws in deduction).
1. A remarkable achievement of phenomenologists is a new interpretation of the nature of all scientific concepts that are no longer opposed to feelings.
2. Phenomenologists deserve one more praise. Unlike analysts, hermeneutists and poststructuralists, they do not take the sphere of the mental into the shadow of the language. Mentality is noteworthy.
3. Phenomenologists put the synthesis of experiences at the heart of the matter, but do not explain the way in which this process should be carried out.
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