The combination of rationalism, constructivism and...

A combination of rationalism, constructivism and realism in the object approach

Consider in terms of object model questions that were discussed in Ch. 2 and 8.

From the scheme (9.1.2) follows the possibility of a more sophisticated version of the answer to the disputes between empiricism and rationalism (see Chapter 2) and between realism and antirealism (see Chapter 8).

From our point of view, various modified versions of realism, including a rather fashionable today "structural realism" (see Chapter 8), do not derive realism from the criticism of constructivism. The questions posed within the framework of the dispute between anti-realism and realism can hardly be solved within the framework of single-level models that do not distinguish a layer of grounds.

Within a two-level object The answer to these questions is as follows. At the ORN and PIO level, we are dealing with constructive rationalism Galilean type, described in paragraph 9.1. Rationalism is due to the fact that PIO (similar to Galileo's vacuum) is not derived directly from experience by idealizing or abstracting (like the ideal pendulum in the "Mechanics" by SE Khaikin) , and is introduced taking into account experience (as in Galileo) or available scientific knowledge (as in the case of the theory of relativity (see Chapter 14)), but based on some or other mental constructs ("This is the simplest law, and God and should have arranged "for Galileo). Constructivism is that the theoretical construction of the PIO that is invented and then is embodied in the material with the primary using the preparation operations in the PIO experiment. This embodiment distinguishes the constructivist scheme from hypothetical-deductive (see paragraph 4.2). As a result, PIPs are artificial, but real objects. All physical objects consist of PIO, which define the ultimate physical ontology. By virtue of this, the SIS constructed from the PIO (i.e., the theory of "normal science") not only describe phenomena (van Fraassen, like Ptolemy's epicycles) but also reveal the ontological essence of the phenomenon, whereby explain it. WIO theories are also capable of making predictions (although Ptolemy could do this). That is, at the level of SIV (normal science) we have a picture in the spirit of realism: SIV consist of real PIOj.

PIO, (classical or quantum particles, fields, etc.) within the framework of the SIV-type work act as analogues of the a priori Kant forms (see Chapter 3 ), but these a priori forms have (as in the Neo-Kantians) a cultural, and not biological, origin (Kant associated them with humanity as a species). In other words, if the technique creates a world of the "second nature", then science creates cultural means ("points" of primary ideal objects) for describing (and also for explaining and predicting) the phenomena of the "first nature". What we will see in the "first nature" depends on these cultural means. However, neither the "first nature" nor the means of science are subjective, although there is a science-culture dependence - "cultural stress" first nature & quot ;. To the accuracy of this cultural loading of the "first nature" given to us as a collection of real objects-materialized PIO), one can speak of reality, objectivity and truth with respect to SIV and "normal science" (in terms of T. Kuhn (see paragraph 6.4)). There is no dependence on the observer or dissolution of the subject/object boundary here, both in the classical and in the quantum physics (see Chapter 15). Natural science, in contrast to technology, believes that the principles of the existence of the world "first nature does not depend on the existence of man and his activity. The ability to disregard the "cultural load" within science is linked to the strategy of reconciling new sections of science with the old ones. This is very clearly seen in the example of physics, where the section with the existing bases is already disappearing. The emerging new branch of physics either forms an independent additional domain (for example, the electric charge of mechanical particles), or agrees with the old section (through the limit transition, as is the case in the case of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics). This agreement is provided by the principle of correspondence widely used in physics (see paragraph 9.7.4).

Maintaining reality, objectivity and truth criteria within the "normal science" (construction of SIV) implies the absence of polysemy of theoretical models of the phenomenon obtained as a result of SIV-type work.

Indeed, as was pointed out in Ch. 8, one of the strong arguments against realism is the thesis that the theory is under-determined by experience. This statement is based on the assumption that the theory consists of statements, the set of which is unlimited. Therefore, for a limited set of empirical statements describing the phenomenon, one can construct an unlimited set of different theories empirically adequate to this phenomenon (see Chapter 8).

In the case of the object approach the freedom to construct theories is much more limited. Due to the small number of FECs, the various models of SIS compiled from them differ quite sharply from one another in the spectrum of their properties. Therefore, the coincidence of the set of manifestations for different models-SIS (from which theories follow) is a short-term situation.

We illustrate this with examples of two types. Competing for a long time corpuscular and wave theory of light belong to the VIO-type. And here, in the end, there was an effect - interference, which solved this issue in favor of one of them. Light as a stream of photons is not a negation, but the development of a wave model that becomes a "seed model" in the quantization procedure (see paragraph 15.3). That is, here we have both critical experiments and refinement, i.e. a temporary, and not a fundamental, underdetermination of the theory of experience. " The continued competition of various research programs in the theory of relativity (see Chapter 14) goes beyond the "normal science" and, accordingly, our thesis, but in physics (unlike the humanities) quite quickly one of the paradigms (research programs) conquers a monopoly position, which is also true in this case. Thus, the logic of the conclusion about the "underdetermination of the theory by experience" proceeds from a misconception about the structure of natural science knowledge, and the history of science does not confirm the correctness of this thesis.

Object the model knocks out the ground and from under the main arguments of structural realism (see Chapter 8), which asserts the realism is not objects, but relations fixed by mathematical expressions. Criticism of the thesis about the "incredible efficiency of mathematics" is given in paragraph 9.4. Another popular argument in favor of structural realism is the preservation of the equations obtained for waves, heat transfer, etc. when changing the ontological model of the object (the transition from ether to electromagnetic field, from heat to heat energy and statistical physics) is explained by the fact that these are the properties of one ideal object - a continuous medium (for more details, see [21, Chapter 4]), t .e. here we are talking about relations that are true for any medium, so they do not change when changing the type of medium. So, in the center here are not relations that stand behind objects (such as the relational theories of space in Chapter 14), and the ideal object is a continuous medium that has many varieties, one of which is the electromagnetic field. That is, in the case of SIV, there is not a structural but an ontological realism, where the basic ontological units are PIOj.

As for the dispute of empiricism and rationalism , here we have a combination of both: the empirical component consists in the availability and study of the empirical phenomenon, and the rationalistic component in design of SIV from PIOj. An integral unit is a pair consisting of an empirical phenomenon and its theory (SIV). This combination is very bright in the mental experiment analyzed in paragraph 10.5.

Also We Can Offer!

Other services that we offer

If you don’t see the necessary subject, paper type, or topic in our list of available services and examples, don’t worry! We have a number of other academic disciplines to suit the needs of anyone who visits this website looking for help.

How to ...

We made your life easier with putting together a big number of articles and guidelines on how to plan and write different types of assignments (Essay, Research Paper, Dissertation etc)